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The aim of this paper is to examine the implications of the implementation of the 'ssnip' test 
for market definition in competition analysis in New Zealand, subsequent to its inclusion in 
the New Zealand Business Acquisition Guidelines released by the Commerce Commission in 
October 1996. The 'ssnip' test defines a market as that in which a hypothetical monopolist 
of a product could impose a ~mall yet ~ignificant non-transitory increase in p_rice without 
losing its customers to substitute products. As the ssnip test is originally derived from the 
United States, this paper seeks to determine whether it is an appropriate test for the notably 
different New Zealand markets. The paper raises potential criticisms of the ssnip test 
regarding the size and the duration of the hypothetical price increase, which price level from 
which to hypothesise a price increase, whether the ssnip test necessitates supply side 
considerations in market definition and the effect of price discrimination. The Business 
Acquisition Guidelines address each of these issues and comparisons are made with other 
jurisdictions who employ the ssnip test, in determining the adequacy of the Guidelines' 
coverage. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes and bibliography) comprises 
approximately 11 ,378 words. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Competition policy in New Zealand is governed by the Commerce Act 1986. The Act, 
which is closely based on the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974, aims to prevent the 
establishment or operation of business arrangements which reduce competition, to prevent 
firms possessing market power from using that market power for an anticompetitive 
purpose and to provide for the scrutiny of mergers and takeovers to prevent undesirable 
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acquisitions of market power. 1 The Commerce Act is enforced by the Commerce 
Commission (''the Commission") and the courts.2 In October 1996 the Commission 
released its first Business Acquisition Guidelines (''the Guidelines")
3 outlining the 
approach the Commission will undertake in assessing the competition implications of 
proposed business acquisitions. As in any competition analysis, the first step in such 
assessment is definition of the relevant market to provide the context in which those 
competition implications will be relevant.4 The Guidelines have adopted the use of the 
"ssnip" test to define the relevant market as the smallest space within which a hypothetical 
profit-maximising sole supplier of a good or service would impose at least a §mall yet 
§ignificant and non-transitory increase in p_rice, assuming all other terms of sale remain 
constant. 5 This means that if a hypothetical monopolist of a product (or service) could 
increase the price of that product by five percent without losing its customers to substitute 
products then the market will be defined as consisting solely of that product. If customers 
did switch to substitute products or services, the market would be broadened to include 
the products or services that were switched to. 
1 RJ Ahdar ( ed) Competition Law and Policy in New 'Zealand (The Law Book Co Ltd, Sydney, 1991 ), 22. 
2 See Part I of the Commerce Act 1986. The Commission is a body corporate. Van Roy describes
 its main 
functions as determining applications for authorisations of certain restrictive trade practices wh
ich would 
otherwise be prohibited, determining applications for clearances and authorisations of propose
d business 
acquisitions, authorising prices for goods and services which have been placed under price c
ontrol and 
taking enforcement proceedings in respect of contraventions of certain provisions of the Act. Se
e page 8. 
3The Commerce Commission "Business Acquisition Guidelines 1996". 
4 An accurate definition of the relevant market is considered the essential and principal prerequis
ite to the 
resolution of any competition law dispute. 
5Aboven 3, 14. 
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The 'ssnip' test was pioneered by the United States Department of Justice when it was 
included in the 1982 Merger Guidelines6 and has now become a world-wide standard for 
defining antitrust markets. 7 This paper will consider whether or not the formal 
implementation of the ssnip test into New Zealand competition law analysis is appropriate 
given New Zealand's unique economical and geographic position, with small populations 
markets. The paper will provide an explanation of how the ssnip test is applied under the 
Guidelines and how this approach compares with judicial market definition prior to the 
release of the Guidelines and how it compares with that of other jurisdictions which have 
adopted the ssnip test. Potential criticisms of the elements of the test will be discussed 
and reference will be made to how other jurisdictions have addressed such issues. Such 
discussion will include the difference between competitive and current price levels, the size 
and time period of the price increase, price discrimination and product differentiation, and 
whether supply side considerations should be included in the market definition process. 
It should be noted that although the ssnip test can be used to define a relevant market for 
any sort of competition analysis, this paper will mostly focus on the Guidelines use of the 
test in defining a market for the purpose of analysing a business acquisition. 
6US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 1992 The 
ssnip test was also included in the 1984 and 1992 United States Guidelines 
7See Consumer And Corporate Affairs Canada (Director of Investigation and Research - Competition 
Act) Merger Enforcement Guidelines, 1991; Australian Competition & Consumer Commission Merger 
Guidelines, 1996; European Draft Notice on Markel Definition 1997 and Nestle/Perrier. 
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II MARKET DEFINITION FOR BUSINESS ACQUISITION ANALY
SIS 
A Business Acquisitions and the Commerce Act 1986 
Prior to the Commerce Amendment Act 1990 parties to a merger or
 takeover were 
required to seek clearance or authorisation from the Commission. 
8 Under the new 
provisions, parties to the acquisition can elect whether or not to seek cle
arance from the 
Commission before implementation. However, the Commission can cha
llenge any non-
notified proposal which it considers has been, or is about to be, implemented in brea
ch of 
the dominance rules in section 47 of the Commerce Act 1986. That section provides:
 
(I) No person shall acquire the assets of a business or shares if, as a
 result of the 
acquisition,-
(a) The person or another person would be, or would be likely to be, in a dom
inant 
position in a market; or 
(b) That person's or another person's dominant position in a market would be
, or 
would be likely to be, strengthened. 
The Commission has described the concept of a "dominant position" as:
9 
A person can be considered to have a dominant position in a market when th
at person is 
able to make significant business decisions, particularly those relating to
 price and 
supply, without regard to the competitors, suppliers or customers of that perso
n .... it may 
8 Acquisitions which were prima facie anticompetitive could be authorised b
y the Commission if they 
were in the "public interest". Sees 66-69 prior to amendment in 1990. 
9 News Ltd/Independent Newspapers Ltd (1986) 6 NZAR 47. 
reasonably be inferred that this ability to act independently is presum
ed to arise only in 
markets where there is an absence of competition. 
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The Business Acquisition Guidelines set out the Commission's ap
proach to assessing 
whether or not the acquisition will result in, or be likely to result in, a 
dominant position in 
a market or strengthening of a dominant position. They serve as a g
uide to the business 
community and its ad visors of the circumstances where the Commissio
n may be concerned 
about a business acquisition and may seek to prevent it. This insi
ght into the internal 
decision-making of the Commission is of considerable assistance unde
r the new voluntary 
pre-merger notification regime. 10 
B Market Definition Prior to the Business Acquisition Guideline
s 
The initial step in examining whether a firm would acquire or strengthen
 a dominant 
position in a market is definition of the relevant market. Market
 definition gives an 
indication of the market in which the undertaking is operating and pr
ovides a framework 
in which the competition implications of an application can be analy
sed. The larger the 
relevant market, the less likely the parties to the acquisition will be in 
a dominant position. 
If the market is defined too broadly, consumers may be forced to con
sider goods that are 
not really adequate substitutes for the goods they desire. On the othe
r hand, if the market 
is defined too narrowly, a trader may be penalised for conduct whic
h, although harms a 
10 Parties to business acquisition proposals can elect to seek clearan
ce from the Commission before 
implementation. The Commission can challenge any non-notified pr
oposal which it considers has been, 
or is about to be, implemented in breach of the dominance rule. See s
s 66 and 83 to 85 of the Commerce 
Act 1986. 
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competitor, does not really affect the market or harm consumers. 11 This is not what the 
Commerce Act seeks to do. The Commerce Act defines a market as: 12 
the term 'market' is a reference to a market in New Zealand for goods and services as 
well as other goods and services that, as a matter of good commercial common sense, 
are substitutable for them. 
This definition stems from the following passage in Edmonds Food Jndustries/WF Tucker 
& Co Ltd: 13 
In delineating the relevant market in any particular case there is a value judgement which 
must be made which involves, for example, an assessment of pertinent market realities 
such as technology, distance, cost and price incentives; an assessment of the degree of 
substitutability of a product; an appreciation of the fact that a market is dynamic and that 
potential competition is relevant; and an evaluation of industry viewpoints and public 
tastes and attitudes. Particularly important in this process is industry recognition (both 
by suppliers and purchasers) and recognition by the consumer. Ultimately the judgement 
as to the appropriate market - and its delineation by function, produ'-'i and area - is a 
question of fact which must be made on the basis of commercial commonsense in the 
circumstances of each case. 
Although the concept of substitutability was not included in the Commerce Act's 
definition of a market until 1990, it is clear that the Commission and the courts had 
11 Y Van Roy Guidebook to New Zealand Competition Laws (CCH NZ Ltd, Auckland, 1991), 61 . 
12 Section 3(1A) of the Commerce Act 1986. 
13 Commerce Commission Decision No 84 (21 June 1984), para 7. 
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previously recognised the importance of the concept.
14 Judge Barker m Auckland 
Regional Authority v Mutual Rental Cars (Auckland Airport) Lt stated:
15 
.. . one must take the goods or services relevant to the inquiry and identify the area of close 
rivalry or competition, seeking the boundaries by examination of the ready availability or 
interchangeability of substitute services in response to economic incentives of demand or 
supply; in other words, to use 'economists' speak, one must identify cross-elasticity of 
demand and cross-elasticity of supply. 
Cross-elasticity of demand refers to the change in demand in response to a change in 
price. 16 Thus the concept of measuring substitutability in response to an increase in price 
is not new. As the High Court stated in Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd. v 
Commerce Commission17, "the mental test that prompts a summary evaluation of the 
evidence is to ask how buyers and sellers would likely react to a notional small percentage 
increase in price of the products of interest". 
An economically meaningful market will include everything that offers substitution for the 
products or services at issue for significant numbers of consumers and will exclude from 
the market all those things that are not realistic substitutes. The ssnip test is a convenient 
14 Substitutability was introduced into the Commerce Act's definition of market through the Co
mmerce 
Amendment Act I 990 which brought the definition more in line with the Australian definition
. Prior to 
the change, the market was defined as '"Market' means a market for goods or services w
ithin New 
Zealand that may be distinguished as a matter of fact and commercial common sense." 
15 [1987] 2 NZLR 647. See also Tooth & Co Ltd and Tooheys Ltd, In re (1979) 39 FLR 1 and Tr
u Tone 
Ltd v Festival Records Retailing Marketing Ltd [1988] 2 NZLR 352; (1988) 2 TCLR 542 (CA).
 
16 Elasticity of demand is discussed in part II D2 of this paper. 
17 (1991) 4 TCLR 473,501. 
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way to define a market in terms of the goods or services supplied or pu
rchased (the 
product/service dimension) and the geographic areas from which the goods or
 services are 
obtained or within which the goods or services are supplied (the geographic d
imension). 18 
C The Ssnip Test 
The Guidelines define the relevant market as the smallest space with
in which a 
hypothetical profit-maximising sole supplier of a good or service would imp
ose at least a 
§mall yet §ignificant and non-transitory increase in nrice, assuming all other 
terms of sale 
remain constant. 19 The Commission will generally consider a ssnip to in
volve a five 
percent increase in price for a period of a minimum of one year.
20 When using the test In 
Goodman Fielder the Commission posed the question as:
21 
If the price of the product were to be raised by a hypothetical monopolist by
 a ssnip (say, 
five percent), above the competitive level for at least a year, would s
o many buyers 
switch to buying alternative products (demand-side substitutability), or w
ould so much 
additional supply be added by new suppliers switching their production to
 the product in 
question (supply-side substitutability), that the price rise would not be pro
fitable? 
18The Commerce Commission will also seek to define the relevant market i
n terms of functional level 
(level in the distribution chain) and time but the ssnip test is not relevant 
to such analysis. 
19 Above n 3, pl4. 
20 Above n 3, 15. 
21 Commerce Commission Decision No 289 Goodman Fielder Limited; and D
efiance Mills Limited 14 
April 1997, 9-10. 
9 
Market definition and the ssnip approach is to be disting
uished from assessing whether a 
business acquisition will lead to the strengthening of
 a dominant position. Market 
definition is a hypothetical exercise to estimate buyer re
action to a price increase. This 
process does not presuppose that a ssnip would result fro
m the actual acquisition. That is 
to be evaluated once the terms of the relevant market hav
e been identified.22 
D The Product Market 
1 Introduction 
The relevant product market refers to what products ar
e sufficiently close substitutes to 
compete effectively in each other's market. Definition
 of the product market plays an 
important part in the outcome of the case which will o
ften depend on how willing the 
Commission or the court is to accept a wider range of
 goods as plausible substitutes. 
23 
Initially markets are defined narrowly as consisting of the
 product or service produced by 
two or more of the parties to the acquisition. If, in respo
nse to the imposition of a ssnip, 
profits would be unlikely to increase for a hypothetica
l monopolist of those products 
because buyers switch to substitute products, then the 
next best substitute product or 
service will be added to the initial market definition an
d the ssnip test repeated. The 
process continues until no significant switching occurs in
 response to the increase in price 
and the combination of products or services is found whe
re a ssnip would be profitable. 
22 Above n 3, 15. 
23 Above n 11. 
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2 Economic evidence 
The Guidelines state that the key determinant of the 
product or service dimension of a 
market is substitutability in demand. Ideally, the substi
tutability of one product or service 
for another is determined by reference to the cross-ela
sticity of demand between them.
24 
The importance of elasticity in market definition w
as emphasised by Dawson J in 
Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v The Broken Hil
l Proprietary Co Ltd & Anor25
 
The basic test involves the ascertainment of the cr
oss-elasticities of both supply and 
demand, that is to say, the extent to which the sup
ply of or demand for the product 
responds to a change in the price of another produc
t. Cross-elasticities of supply and 
demand reveal the degree to which one product m
y be substituted for another, an 
important consideration in any definition of a market.
 
An elasticity test has the advantage that it does not rely 
on any intuition to determine the 
substitutability, since it is a purely scientific test base
d on established data. However, 
there are limitations to the use of this test. The reliab
ility of cross-elasticity results rests 
with the choice of products to include in the tests. 
Where it is difficult to select the 
correct products for inclusion, the conclusions will 
differ dramatically in the ultimate 
market shares given. 26 Important as they are, elastic
ities and the notion of substitution 
24 Cross-elasticity of demand refers to the extent to whic
h the physical characteristics, properties or 
performance of the product concerned are different fro
m those of other products in the market. 
25(1989) ATPR40-925, 50-014. 
26 P Crowther "Product Market Definition in EC Compe
tition Law: The Compatibility of Legal And 
Economic Approaches" [1996) JBL 177, 186. 
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provide no complete solution to the definition of a market. A question of degree is 
involved - at what point do different goods become closely enough linked in supply or 
demand to be included in the one market. The answer to such a question precludes any 
dogmatic answer. Although the economic logic of the ssnip test is clear, implementing the 
test is not always simple. Information on cross-elasticity of demand will rarely be 
available and in most circumstances the Commission will need to rely on the next best 
evidence. 27 
3 Consumer behaviour 
The Commission recognises that the approach to defining a market as described in the 
Guidelines is more of a framework within which case by case judgements can be made, 
rather than a precise and scientific exercise. Whether a ssnip could be profitably imposed 
arguably calls for a speculative prediction of future conduct (namely, whether the acquirer 
will be able to increase prices) which may be influenced by a variety of factors that are 
impossible, or at least difficult, to measure. 
For every product available for each different location, different buyers or groups of 
buyers will react differently to price changes. When the products are not identical or the 
products to which buyers switch are not the same, the relevant market definition rests on 
the aggregate decisions of different classes of customers. Each have different attitudes 
toward the importance of price and product characteristics in deciding whether to 
27 Above n 3, 15, para3.5. 
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substitute or not. Even if consumer response cannot be measured directly, certain 
assumptions about consumer behaviour can generate fairly safe conclusion. For example, 
it is generally assumed that consumers "maximise" in the sense that they are constantly on 
the lookout for the product that best meets their needs at the lowest possible prices. This 
rationality assumption may generate appropriate market definitions even if the assumptions 
cannot be empirically verified.28 
The Guidelines state that the Commission will consider the views, marketing and sales 
strategies and behaviour of buyers, and analyses of historical and likely future trends in 
buyer behaviour, in order to estimate buyer willingness to substitute other products or 
services as prices rise.29 The Canadian Guidelines highlight such buyer information as one 
of the most important sources of information to consider: 
What buyers state they are likely to do, what they have done in the past, and their 
strategic business plans, often provide a reliable indication of whether the postulated 
price increase is likely to be imposed and sustained. Where buyers have not substituted 
product B for product A in the past, and indicate that they would not likely do so in the 
event of the price increase, it may be inappropriate to conclude, on the basis of 
hypothetical considerations, that those products compete in the same relevant market. 
The Commission will assess the technical viability of one product or service as 
replacement for another and will also have regard to relative pnces, quality, and 
28 H Hovenkamp Federal Antitrust: The Law of Competition and its Practiced (West Publishing Co, 
Minnesota, 1994).,89. 
29 Above n 3, 13. 
13 
performance when assessing whether in fact they are substitutes.
30 
Those judgements will 
involve consideration of a range of evidence including price trend data, consumer surveys, 
and observation and informed opinion. 
4 Price-trend data 
Price trend data measures price trends of products thought to be in the same market. If 
products are competing in the same market, then the prices are likely to move in a similar 
fashion due to similar supply and demand conditions. If product B is an effective 
substitute for product A then a rise in the price of product A will result in a rise in demand 
for product B. If price movements of groups of products do not correlate with price 
movements of other products it is unlikely that they are in the same relevant market. 
Strong price correlation between products that are superficially substitutable may 
constitute an indicator that the products are in the same market but it may also be due to 
other external factors such as price changes in common inputs, inflation, pricing policies of 
multi-product firms or duties on products such as cigarettes. It is imperative to filter out 
these extraneous factors which may have a common effect on the price of products 
making it appear as if their price evolution is related. 
30 Above n 3, 13 
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5 Observation and informed opinion 
The issue of future price moves and future reactions to price moves usually will be 
examined through the expert testimony of economic experts and the testimony of 
interested witnesses such as executives of the defendant, suppliers, customers or the 
defendant's competitors. Given the uncertainty of hypothetical shifts in the future, a 
witness can testify in support of almost any conclusion without the fear of effective 
contradiction. The Guidelines state that information obtained from independent experts 
and which predates contemplation of the business acquisition under consideration may be 
more persuasive than that produced specifically for the purposes of a proposal. 
31 
This is 
not to say that future hypothetical price reactions should be ignored. There will be some 
situations in which reliable evidence of future pricing is available. 
Economists are able to assist the court in relation to economic principles. But once the 
relevant principles are expounded their application to the facts of the case is a matter for 
the court. The definition of a market is entirely a matter of fact, the determination of 
which ought not to be made more protracted and expensive by the adduction of 
unnecessary expert evidence. 32 
31 Above n 3, 13, para 3.1 
32 Wilcox J in Trade Practices Commission v Australian Meatholdings Pty Ltd (1988) I O A TPR 40-876, 
49-479. 
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In Goodman Fielder33 , which was concerned with proposed acquisition of baking and 
milling operations, the Commission staff discussed the proposal with a range of parties 
with an interest in the relevant industries. 34 These included farmers, flour millers, bread 
bakers, bakery ingredient suppliers, bakery product manufacturers and supermarkets. 
Written submissions were received from various parties and additional information was 
sought and obtained for the parties to the proposed acquisition. 
6 Consumer surveys 
Consumer surveys are listed as a relevant consideration in the process of defining markets. 
A good example of where consumer questionnaires have been used was in the soft drink 
merger in the United States.35 Pepsi-Cola, the second largest producer of carbonated soft 
drinks in the United States proposed to acquire 7-Up, the fourth largest producer of soft 
drinks. Coca-Cola, the largest producer of soft drinks, proposed to acquire Dr Pepper, 
the fourth largest producer. Royal Crown, the fifth largest producer, opposed the mergers 
on the ground that smaller producers' costs would rise at the bottling stage of production 
because the bottler network would no longer be able to bottle 7-Up and Dr Pepper along 
with the smaller brands. The predominant issue in the litigation that followed became the 
definition of the relevant product market. The plaintiff wanted the market to be confined 
to soft drinks. A nUIJilber of alternative product market definitions could have been 
33 Above n 21 . 
34 These included wheat, flour, stock feed, bakery ingredients and baked goods industries. See Goodman 
Fielder Limited, above n 21, 2. 
35 D Bull "Implementing Department of Justice Merger Guidelines" (1996) 41 Antitrust Bulletin, 678. 
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adopted without causing concentration levels to fall sufficiently low to warrant approval of 
the mergers. Thus an important issue in this case was the degree of substitution of other 
beverages for soft drinks. An estimate of the price elasticity of demand for carbonated 
soft drinks became essential as an inelastic demand for a product is a sufficient (but not 
necessary) condition for demonstrating a relevant antitrust market. No prior estimates of 
the price elasticity of demand or data for estimating demand elasticity for soft drinks or for 
performing the relevant price correlation with other beverages alleged to be part of the 
market could be found. In a somewhat novel approach to measuring demand elasticity, 
consumers were directly questioned. 
Consumers were asked about the consumption pattern of carbonated soft beverages, the 
quantities bought, the dollars spent on them, and the types of stores in which they are 
purchased and then they were led to focus on the type and size most frequently purchased 
and the price paid for it. Half of the sample were asked: 
Suppose you found out that the price of carbonated soft drinks had gone down 
permanently by about 5 percent, this means you would pay ... cents less for the (insert 
modal buy) for which you now pay ... cents. Would you and your family drink more of 
these beverages or would you continue to buy the same amount you drink now? 
' The other half of the sample was asked a corresponding question about a permanent price 
increase, followed by the inquiry whether it would reduce consumption. A continuation 
of the questions asked interviewees how much more they would buy; either spending the 
17 
same amount of money (price elasticity of one), or buying more soft drinks (price elasticity 
greater than one), or buying the same amount of soft drinks (price elasticity of zero). 
Following hypothetical calculation (using increase or decrease of 10 or 15 percent 
consumption) all four elasticity estimates fell within the inelastic region of demand. 
Therefore, the results supported the notion that soft drinks form a relevant antitrust 
market. 
The consumers who revealed a price elasticity of demand for soft drinks that was greater 
than zero were asked whether they would consume more or less of some other beverages 
if they bought less or more of the soft drinks. If so, what would those beverages be. The 
results showed that although consumers will substitute certain other beverages for soft 
drinks, the degree of substitutability is sufficiently low to treat soft drinks as a relevant 
antitrust market ( as opposed to the defendant's proposition that the relevant market was 
"all beverages"). The use of the consumer survey allowed clear ranking of the substitutes 
that emerged, which would have been much less apparent under the more traditional 
approaches to market definition. 
A consumer survey approach has two major advantages in market definition. The 
Guidelines are concerned with a hypothetical price change from current levels as the 
determinative factor to ponsider. Such as standard is forward looking. A well designed 
survey instrument can provide a reliable measure of demand side product and/or 
geographic substitutability and can be used to assess, at least, the likely future response of 
18 
consumers to a change in price. A second advantage is that a survey can be designed to 
yield information about the alternative products or geographic areas that consumers view 
as substitutes for the set being considered under the provisional market definition. 
36 
However, consumer surveys are not without their disadvantages. As the Guidelines 
specify that the response to a hypothetical price change from current levels be considered 
the determinative issue, the ideal question would ask 'what did you do ... ?', rather than, 
'what would you do if ... ?' . However, such hypothetical questions are the standard form in 
public opinion polling. Questionnaires which ask consumers to state their response to 
price increases of the product in question may be addressing the issue in an erroneous 
manner. Most consumers are not likely to be able to predict what their response to a 
hypothetical situation would be. Although the survey methodology is useful in addressing 
demand-side substitutability , it is less well suited to dealing with the question of supply-
side substitutes across product geographic space. As a result, the demand elasticity 
estimates that emerge will generally fail to reflect the impact of the supply response of 
outside firms. 
7 European approach 
Prior to the European I Commission's Draft notice on the Definition of the Relevant 
Market, produced in 1997, the European Community had no specific test for market 
definition. However, the case law in the Community had developed to the point where 
36 Above n 35., 689. 
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some general guidelines could be identified. Products would be regarded as 
interchangeable by reason of the product's characteristics, functionality, prices and 
intended use. In some cases, a comparison of physical characteristics and functionality 
will be sufficient to achieve a workable product market definition and more sophisticated 
evidence and complex economic analysis may not be necessary. Physical characteristics 
may include the speed of operation, level of performance, diversity of application, and 
other factors which buyers would regard as important parameters of functionality to fulfil 
their needs. 
However, the Draft Notice states that "product characteristics and intended use are 
insufficient to conclude whether two products are demand substitutes. The functional 
interchangeability of product does "not provide ... sufficient criteria (for market definition) 
because the responsiveness of customers to relative price changes may be determined by 
other considerations also". The notice states that the existence of groups of captive 
consumers will not of itself define a market unless those consumers can be price 
discriminated against effectively.37 Here the Commission, in effect, says it is going to 
ignore the reasoning of the European Court of Justice in United Brands.
38 The Draft 
Notice specifically mentions elasticity estimates, correlation studies, Granger causality 
calculation, price consequence tests and trade flow tests. However, the most emphasis is 
37 Captive consumers are those who are unable, or unwilling, to switch to substitute products. 
38 United Brands Co v EC Commission [ 1978] 1 CMLR 429. The court concluded hat bananas had 
certain special features which were sufficiently distinctive for it be regarded as representative of a relevant 
product market (as opposed to a market for fresh fruit in general). These special features included year 
round availability and the ability to satisfy the constant needs of an important part of the population 
(consisting of the very young, the old and the sick). 
20 
given to shock analysis which refers to the analysis of evidence relating to past events or 
shocks. When available, this sort of information will normally be fundamental for market 
definition. This approach is similar to the emphasis on historical and likely future buyer 
behaviour in the New Zealand and Canadian Guidelines. 
E The Geographic Market 
J Introduction 
The relevant geographic market refers to what firms are sufficiently proximate to others in 
spatial terms to compete effectively. The Australian Trade Practices Tribunal in Tooth
39 
stated: 
The market should comprehend the maximum range of business activities and the widest 
geographic area within which , if given sufficient economic incentive, buyers can switch 
to a substantial extent from one source of supply to another and sellers can switch to a 
substantial extent from one production plan to another. 
The ssnip test is applied to the geographic market by initially identifying the overlapping 
geographic areas of operation of the parties to the merger. If a hypothetical monopolist of 
the products in that area 
1
imposed a ssnip and customers switched to products outside that 
area, so that the price increase would be unprofitable, this would be an indication that 
39 Tooth & Co Ltd and Tooheys Ltd, In re 1979) 39 FLR 1. 
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suppliers in other areas could provide products which we
re effective substitutes and the 
geographic extent of the market is broader than the area 
initially specified. If that is the 
case the market would be broadened until the switching in
 response to the price increase 
stopped. The Commission will seek to define the geographical d
imension of a relevant 
market on evidence of past and forecast buyer and seller b
ehaviour. When two groups of 
sellers engage in the same advertising or marketing effor
ts in the same geographic ares, 
there is strong evidence that each is part of a single geogra
phic market. Similarly if buyers 
seek price data from two different sets of sellers of simila
r products that is evidence that 
both groups of products are in the same relevant market. 
The United States Guidelines state that the Agency will
 consider evidence that buyers 
have shifted or have considered shifting purchases betwee
n different geographic locations 
in response to relative changes in price or other competitiv
e variables; evidence that sellers 
base business decisions of the prospect of buyer substitutio
n between geographic locations 
in response to relative changes in price or their competi
tive variables; the influence of 
downstream competition faced by buyers in their output m
arkets; and the timing and costs 
of switching suppliers. 
F The Place of Imports in Market Definition 
The deregulation of the New Zealand economy has result
ed in imported goods playing a 
significant part in many New Zealand markets. In a numb
er of markets, the behaviour of 
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New Zealand resident suppliers is constrained by the nature, availability and prices of 
imported products. Despite New Zealand's geographic isolation, economies of scale 
achieved by overseas firms compared to domestic firms often provide them with a cost 
advantage. As the Commerce Act defines a market to be a "market in new Zealand" the 
Commission will adopt a national market. However, under section 3(3) appropriate 
overseas suppliers can and should be considered as providing effective competition in New 
Zealand, exercising a similar constraint to domestic suppliers. 
Under the Guidelines the Commission will generally consider actual competition from 
imported products to be equivalent to that from domestic supply. Imports and potential 
imports will be considered as part of the assessment of the constraint from market entry. 
However, the examination of a number of factors suggests that the Commission will be 
cautious in assessing import competition.40 These factors include the existence of any 
limits on quantities of imported products and the effects of tariffs, transport costs, 
international price movements and changing exchange rates on trade.
41 
The Commission should have regard to whether. existing import supplies could 
accommodate a significant expansion of supply without the need to invest in sunk costs of 
distribution, advertising and promoting; whether changes to tariff levels and other forms of 
production are likely to occur over the next two to three years and information that 
overseas corporations have concrete plans to enter the Australian market. 
40 MN Berry "The Commerce Commission's First Business Acquisitions Guidelines: A Comment" (1997) 
3 NZBLQ 75. 
41 Above n 3, 16. 
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III COMPETITIVE OR CURRENT PRICE LEVELS? 
The purpose of the ssnip test is to predict the consequences of an increase in price. 
However, that prediction may differ depending on whether the proposed increase 
originates from current price levels or from competitive levels. If the firms selling the 
product in question are already charging a higher than competitive price, customers of that 
product are likely to be more willing to switch to substitute products in response to a price 
increase. Those products that were switched to will be included in the relevant market, 
thus expanding the market and lessening market power. 
The effect of imposing a ssnip from higher than competitive prices was evidenced in the 
infamous Cellophane42 case. du Pont was charged with monopolising the manufacture 
and sale of cellophane. The government argued that the relevant market was cellophane 
whereas du Pont argued that the relevant market was all flexible wrapping materials.
43 
The court concluded that the proper market included all flexible packaging materials on 
the grounds that a slight increase or decrease in the price of cellophane caused 
"considerable numbers of customers of other flexible wrappings to switch" demonstrating 
that the products competed in the same market. The majority reached this conclusion 
despite the findings that cellophane had significant differences from other flexible 
packaging materials, cost two or three times as much per surface measure as its chief 
42 United States v EI du Pont de Nemous & Co 351 US 377 (1956). 
43 Such as wax paper, glassine, pliofilm and saran wrap 
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competitors and was the only flexible packaging material suitable to the needs of certain 
users (particularly cigarette manufacturers). The dissenters emphasised that du Pont's 
profits on cellophane were unusually high. Accordingly, it is likely that various classes of 
customers of cellophane were willing to switch to substitute products if du Pont raised its 
price. The fact that du Pont earned profits substantially above average is direct and more 
reliable evidence of the fact that it did enjoy market power.
44 
The 'cellophane fallacy' is addressed by the approach in the New Zealand Guidelines 
which is concerned with substitutability at competitive market prices. Where the 
Commission considers that prices in a given market are significantly different from 
competitive levels it may be necessary to hypothesise as to the effect of a ssnip from 
competitive price levels, so that appropriate substitutes are considered.
45 The 1992 United 
States Guidelines have a similar approach by stating that prevailing prices will be used 
unless coordinated interaction among firms in the provisional market is observed already 
to be occurring the agency will not use the current prices as a starting point, but rather "a 
price more reflective of the competitive price.46 
Neither the New Zealand nor the United States Guidelines say how to determine whether 
the price is non-competitive or when to make that determination or how to identify the 
competitive price. An absence of such information may lead to some uncertainty. The 
44 R Pitofsky ''New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust (1990) Columbia Law 
Review 1805, 1814. 
45 Above n 3, 15. 
46 Above n 6, para 1.11. 
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1982 and 1984 United States Guidelines noted the administration burdens of hypothesising 
a price increase from competitive levels, rather than from the actually observed price level. 
A comparison of price to marginal cost, demonstrating the magnitude of the price/cost 
differential is the most accurate indicator of market power. However, since marginal cost 
is unknown to most firms, it is not a practicable alternative. Pitofsky suggests that a more 
manageable approach would be to measure "profit". However, the common measure in 
:financial statements is accounting profit, rather than economic profit.
47 
Ultimately 
however, the issue is not measuring profit, but rather determining whether profits over a 
long period of the time are exceptionally high compared to similar product lines or 
industries. 
The Cellophane case was concerned with monopolising the manufacture of cellophane 
under section 2 of the Sherman Act 1890 rather than a merger under section 7 of the 
Clayton Act. Merger analysis is concerned with whether the merger would create or 
enhance market power, rather than whether market power is being exercised. It is arguable 
that the relevant price level in merger cases is the current price level as merger cases are 
concerned with the future and whether prices will rise above the current level in the future. 
Even if a market demonstrates high prevailing prices, section 47 of the Commerce Act 
may not be violated if the merger does not make the situation worse by strengthening a 
dominant position in a rvarket. This argument is weak for several reasons. A merger 
47 For example, a firm in an expanding market may invest heavily in research and development or plant 
expansion and thereby show little accounting profit, despite its considerable market power. By contrast, a 
firm in a declining industry or with a declining product may invest little in new w facilities in marketing 
and show considerable "profit" but have little market power. 
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among the members of a cartel ( who are charging less than competitive prices) further 
lessens competition as it stabilises the agreement. Secondly, sellers or buyers in a highly 
concentrated market are likely to be able to coordinate more effective strategic behaviour 
to exclude rivals. Finally an interpretation of section 47 that ignored the Cellophane 
fallacy would lead to absurd results48 such as where a totally effective cartel would not be 
made worse by a merger which seems obviously inconsistent with the aims of Parliament 
when it passed the Commerce Act. 
IV SSNIP TEST FACTORS 
A Is a Five Percent Increase Suitable? 
The Commission will generally consider a ssnip to involve a five percent increase in price 
for a period of a minimum of one year. This five percent figure appears to have been 
plucked from the United States Guidelines. Although the word 'generally' implies a 
degree of flexibility, the New Zealand Guidelines, like their United States counterpart, 
provide no information as to when that flexibility may be exercised or what percentage 
change is appropriate. As a lower percentage will generally result in a narrower market, 
with fewer substitutes, it is possible that a lower percentage would be more appropriate in 
defining New Zealand ~kets rather than adopting the same percentage figure as larger 
jurisdictions. 
48 Above n 44, 1846, 
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It has been argued that a five percent test for all markets is flawed. If the parties to the 
merger were currently selling their products at a depressed price then a price increase 
following the merger may not cause product switching among buyers because it would 
simply raise the prices to a competitive level. Similarly, if monopoly prices were already 
being extracted from the firms, an increase in price following the merger would be more 
likely to cause product switching.49 
Secondly, the significance of any percentage increase will vary depending on profit 
margins in the industry. A five percent increase could lead to a much larger increase in 
profit.50 In an industry with narrow profit margins, such as food retailing, a profitable 
price increase less than five percent could indicate a great market power. On the other 
hand, for a high risk industry such as oil drilling, a five percent increase would indicate 
little about market power even if buyers did not switch to substitute products. The 
Canadian Guidelines recognise that a larger price threshold may be more appropriate in 
"situations where a five percent increase involving products purchased by consumers 
would be measured in cents rather than in dollars".51 A larger figure may also be more 
suitable in product differentiated markets. Thus any percentage test should be applied 
flexibly, taking the nature of the competition in the market into account.
52 
49 See discussion on competitive prices in part III of this paper. 
so GJ Werden "Market Delineation" (1993) 38 Antitrust Bulletins 517. 
51 For example, a five percent increase in the price of a chocolate bar would only be approximately five 
cents. 
52 Above n 44, 1819. 
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Despite the United States Guidelines describing a five percent increase, it is commonly 
understood that a ten percent hypothetical price increase is commonly used by the 
Commission. It is argued that a smaller figure encourages pursuit of trivial or even 
desirable market power. A larger figure may seem apt, particularly in product 
differentiated markets It is suggested that the fact finder hypothesise a price increase of 
ten percent above the competitive level and consider the impact of such a price increase on 
customer demand, competitor supply and entry. 
B "Would" Versus "Could" 
The New Zealand and American Guidelines require that the hypothetical monopolist 
"would" impose at least a "small but significant and non-transitory" increase in price. the 
Canadian Guidelines adopted the word "could" partly to be consistent with the United 
States 1984 Guidelines and partly because it was thought that use of the work "would" 
might create an undue burden on the Bureau. 53 As it would ordinarily be rational for 
someone who has the power to raise prices to do so, "could" will usually translate into 
"would". However, it is the ability of the hypothetical monopolist to raise prices, rather 
than the demonstration that it "would" (which may sometimes prove difficult) which is 
important. 
53PS Crampton "Canada's New Merger Enforcement Guidelines: A 'Nuts and Bolts' Review" (1993) 38 
Antitrust Bulletin 665, 682. 
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C Period of Increase 
The New Zealand Guidelines consider that generally a ssnip will involve a five percent 
increase in price for a period of a minimum of one year. The Canadian Guidelines 
followed the United States 1984 Guidelines by stating that a one year period would in 
most contexts be used. In the 1992 Guidelines the one-year specification has been 
replaced with "the foreseeable future" which apparently will vary with the industry 
involved. United States Federal Agency staff have suggested that one interpretation could 
be "for one product cycle" or ''until the next purchase decision". 
54 The provision clearly 
grants substantial discretion to the decisionmaker and may give rises to some uncertainty. 
The Canadian Guidelines explain that a one year period is allowed for response to a price 
increase because sellers that would require more than this amount of time to respond to an 
increase in the price of a product generally do not exercise a significant constraint on the 
price of that product. Suppliers who would take longer than a year to respond to a price 
increase are considered at the barriers to entry stage. Although the New Zealand 
Guidelines do not consider supply substitution at the market definition stage, a one year 
period seems to be a more appropriate approach for the New Zealand Guidelines to 
follow, as it provides more certainty than the United States period and would, in most 
cases, encompass ''the next purchase decision" interpretation. 
54 T Calvani and WT Miller "31 Questions" (1993) 38 Antitrust Bulletin 593. 
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V SUPPLY SIDE CONSIDERATIONS 
A Introduction 
Just as a consumer may consider a particular product a suitable substitute for the product 
at issue, a producer may regard the production of that product or a substitute product as a 
viable possibility. Existing firms manufacturing a similar product to the one in question or 
the same product some distance away will often be able to respond to a price increase 
rather quickly. If the production process could be redesigned promptly and sharply to 
produce the second product, then it may be necessary to count that potential "supply 
substitution" in the product market. It is possible that due to supply side substitutability a 
monopolist of a relevant market could not raise prices because in response to an attempted 
price increase, other producers may be able to switch at low cost to producing the product 
in question, or a suitable substitute The existence of supply-side substitutability has the 
effect of enlarging the product market under consideration where the products concerned 
are not interchangeable in terms of demand. 
Supply substitution can come from a series of sources. Excess capacity is a more certain 
source of supply in the event of a ssnip than an entirely new entrant and these substitute 
sources can usually be initiated or diverted to a market within a time period which can be 
reliably determined. Capacity in production can consist of location, shelf space and 
technical knowledge. A retailer will be able to switch that capacity to supply varying 
30 
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merchandise lines and varying quantities of service (such as delivery and advice) in 
accordance with profit incentives. Captive production which is presently committed to 
internal use may be diverted to the open market in the event of a ssnip. Where there are 
economies of scope, there will normally be an accompanying capacity to take advantage of 
substitution in production. 55 However, substitution may be prevented by the potential 
long-term consequences56 of diversion in response to what may a "non-transitory" but also 
not permanent increase in price. Other sources include products currently sold outside the 
market that could be diverted, processes turning out currently non-competitive products 
that could be adjusted and new entry in the form of expanded entry or grassroots entry.
57 
However, if the supply-side factors are to be taken into account in the market definition 
the difficulty arises where to draw the line between supply-side substitutes and potential 
entrants. 58 
B The New Zealand Guidelines 
New Zealand's approach is somewhat ambiguous. The Guidelines concentrate on demand 
side factors in market definition largely to the exclusion of supply-side factors. Supply 
side factors are considered at a later point when identifying the participants in the relevant 
market. At this later stage, "near entrants", that is businesses which can and would 
55 Above n 1,134. 
56 Such as labour contract, expensive fixed cost considerations, loss of customers of downstream pr
oducts 
lost as a result of diverting captive supply, and a reputation for unreliability of switching back 
and forth 
between captive and open markets. See discussion in Pitofsky, above n 44, 1851. 
57 Above n 44. 
58 The question of whether supply side consideration or "contestability " is more relevant to the 
market 
definition process or to the determination of market power is discussed late in Part of this paper. 
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quickly enter the market in response to an attempt by existing suppliers to raise prices or 
reduce output, and existing suppliers, are included in the identification of market 
participants. Such "near entrants" must already possess the facilities and/or the 
knowledge required to produce the goods or services sold in the relevant market. Entry 
by such comparisons must result from redeployment of existing capacity or expansion 
involving minimal sunk costs and minimal delay. Such near entrants should be readily 
identifiable and their potential to supply product markets should be explicitly recognised. 
59 
Despite the detailed description of what constitutes a near entrant at this later stage, the 
Guidelines later acknowledge that, in practice, consideration of supply side factors has 
played a greater part in the market definition process in some Commission and court 
decisions.60 The Guidelines further acknowledge the possibility of including supply-side 
factors in the market definition process by considering that:
61 
So long as an appropriate process of market definition and analysis of market participation and 
entry occurs, that process will generally yield the same conclusions irrespective of whether the 
emphasis at the market definition stage is limited to demand side factors or expanded to 
incorporate supply-side factors as well. 
59 Above n 3, 16. For example, these may be companies which generally export but which could rea
dily 
divert supply to the domestic market. 
60 Above n 17: "competition may proceed both through substitution in demand and substitution in su
pply 
in response to changing prices". See also the Commission's decision of supply substitutes in Com
merce 
Commission Decision No 279 Ravensdown Co Limited; and Southfert Cooperative Limited 21 Ju
ne 1996 
and Goodman Fielder, above 21. 
61 Above n 3, 12. 
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If supply substitutes are already and specifi
cally identifiable it appears likely that t
he 
Commission will include such factors in
 the market definition process. This w
as the 
practice prior to the production of the Gui
delines, as was made clear in Telecom
62 where it 
was stated that "competition may proce
ed both through substitution in demand
 and 
substitution supply in response to changin
g prices". It has also been the practice o
f the 
Commission following the introduction o
f the Guidelines. In Goodman Fielder
63 the 
Commission stated that a properly defined
 market will include those suppliers curren
tly in 
production who are likely, in the event o
f a ssnip, to shift promptly to offer a su
itable 
alternative product even though they do 
not do so currently. Despite recognising
 that 
such suppliers have been referred to as "n
ear entrants", as described in the Guidelin
es at 
the market participation stage, the Comm
ission appeared to use the term interchang
eably 
with supply substitution at the market defi
nition stage. 
Where supply side substitutes are to be 
included in the process of defining a rel
evant 
market, the Commission will consider the 
technical feasibility of switching productio
n and 
the associated costs; the marketing effort
 and expense involved in establishing a cr
edible 
( and profitable) position as a supplier to t
he market; and the degree to which any s
upply 
side substitution has occurred in the past. 
64 
If entry into the market requires no speci
alised investment and is relatively easy so
 that 
barriers are low, it may not be viable to i
nclude the potential competition in the re
levant 
62 Above n 17. 
63 Above n 21. 
64 Above n 3, 12. 
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market. It would be difficult to predict which business would move into the market and 
what their output would be. By contrast, if the manufacture of two products requires a 
great deal of specialised machinery but the cost of switching production between the two 
products is relatively small, barriers to entry from the outside could be quite high. It may 
be appropriate to include the divertible production65 of one in the relevant market of the 
other. 66 In close cases evidence that existing suppliers can switch production is usually 
more convincing than evidence that entry barriers are low. 
C The Australian Approach 
The Australian New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement 
(ANZCERTA)67 is concerned with the removal of tariffs and quantitative restrictions on 
trade in goods between Australia and New Zealand. It provides for companies in one 
country to be able to sell in the other on the basis of their productive efficiency and 
marketing abilities, free of trade barriers. As part of the review of ANZCERTA, New 
Zealand and Australia entered into the Memorandum of Understanding Between the 
Government of New Zealand and the Government of Australia on Harmonisation of 
Business Law. This Memorandum encourages a harmonisation of commercial statutes 
and shared interpretation of commercial law.68 As market definition is a crucial part of 
65Divertible production refers to the output ofrivals not currently sold in the geographic market. 
66 Above n 28, 107 
67 Which came into force on 1 January 1983. 
68 M Brunt "'Market Definition' Issues in Australian and New Zealand Trade Practices Litigation" [1990] 
ABLR86, 89. 
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competition analysis, it is imperative that Australia and New Zealand adopt a similar 
definition process. 
Section 4E of the Trade Practices Act 1974 defines a market as "a market for those goods 
or services and other goods or services that are substitutable for, or otherwise competitive 
with, the first-mentioned goods or services". Market definition in the 1992 Australian 
Guidelines is the first of five stages in evaluating whether a particular acquisition will be 
likely to contravene section 50 of the Trade Practices Act. The explanatory memorandum 
to the Australian Guidelines states69 
The availability of substitute products in a market where a merger takes place allows 
consumers to purchase alternative products if the merged firm seeks to raise its price. 
Similarly the scope for substitution in production may limit the scope for the merged 
firm to raise prices. 
For example, in response to any attempt to increase prices, manufacturers of other 
products which use similar processes may be able to switch at low cost to producing the 
merged firm's product. In such circumstances it is less likely that the merger would 
substantially lessen competition. Similarly, if new substitutes are likely to be available if 
the merged firm raises its prices, the merged firm is likely to be constrained in its 
behaviour, and competition is less likely to be lessened. 
69 At [27]. .. 
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It is evident that, despite the ANZCER TA agreement, the Australian Guidelines differ 
from the New Zealand Guidelines by including both demand and supply side substitutes in 
the market definition process. Supply side substitution which does not require significant 
new investment in response to a ssnip is included in the definition of the relevant market. 
Substitution which would require significant investment is defined as market entry. This 
approach is consistent with past judicial interpretation of the market definition such as in 
the Tooth and Tooheys brewery ties case:70 
... competition may proceed not just through the substitution of one product for another in 
use substitution in demand) but also through the substitution of one source of supply for 
another in production or distribution (substitution in supply). The market should 
comprehend the maximum range of business activities and the widest geographic area 
within which, if given a sufficient economic incentive, buyers can switch to a substantial 
extent from one source of supply to another and sellers can switch to a substantial extent 
from one production plan to another. In an economist's language, both cross-elasticity of 
demand and cross-elasticity of supply are relevant. 
Every judgement in Queensland Wire Industries71 either implicitly or explicitly affinns the 
relevance of substitution in supply; "the capacity to alter the range to those products" 
(Toohey J), it being "relatively easy to convert production from one shape of steel to 
another" (Mason J and Wilson J).72 In considering the possibility of cross-elasticity of 
supply, the Trade Practices Commission has stated that it will need to be concerned that 
70 Above n 39, 18,196. 
71 Above n 25. 
72 Aboven 25, 50,010 and 50,022 
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potential sources of supply could and would be likely to rapidly switch their production 
and distribution facilities to supply a closely substitutable product to the customers of the 
merged firm, without the need for any significant investment of sunk costs in production, 
distribution or promotions.73 
C The United States Approach 
The primary merger control provision in the United States is found in section 7 of the 
Clayton Act 1914 which provides: 
That no person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall 
acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital 
.. . of another person engaged also in commerce or any activity affecting commerce, 
where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such 
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly. 
The 1982 and 1984 United States Guidelines provided that existing production and 
distribution facilities that could be switched easily and economically so as to produce and 
sell in a relevant product market within six months ( extended to a year in the 1984 
Guidelines) would be included but only sales likely to be made or capacity likely to be 
used would be counted. The 1992 Guidelines, like their New Zealand counterpart, state 
that market definition focuses solely on demand substitution factors. Supply substitutes 
73 Australian Draft Merger Guidelines at [2.17]. 
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are considered in the identification of firm
s that participate in the relevant market a
nd the 
analysis of entry. Unlike the New Zea
land Guidelines, the United States Guid
elines use 
the ssnip test at this later stage. Once
 the relevant market is defined, firms vi
ewed as 
participants will include the firms likely to
 enter rapidly into production or sale of
 a market 
product in the market areas in respons
e to a ssnip. A firm, not currently produci
ng or 
selling the relevant product will be consider
ed a market participant if, in response, to
 a 
ssnip, the firm is likely to tum to supply
ing the market with the relevant produc
t. These 
supply responses must be likely to occur wit
hin one year and without the expenditu
re of 
significant sunk costs of entry and exit. 
74 It is interesting to note that these consid
erations 
of potential market participants are s
imilar to those in the Australian Guid
elines for 
determination of what supply substitutes
 will be included in the market definition. 
E The European Community Approa
ch 
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rom
e address anticompetitive arrangements 
and abuse 
of a dominant position respectively bu
t are inadequate to control mergers e
ffectively. 
Explicit merger control regulation was 
adopted by the European Community C
ouncil in 
1989 by regulation 4069/89 on the Con
trol of Concentration Between Underta
kings. It 
focuses entirely on market concentration
s and provides that any market concentr
ation that 
74Sunk costs are the acquisition of costs of
 tangible and intangible assets that canno
t be recovered through 
the redeployment of those assets outside 
the relevant market. That is costs unique
ly incurred to supply the 
relevant product and geographic market
. a significant sunk cost is one which
 would not be recouped 
within one year of the commencement of
 the supply response. 
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"strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be 
significantly impeded" is incompatible with the quality of the common market. 
In its 1993 Competition Policy Report the Commission stated that supply-side 
substitutability is normally considered by the Commission under its assessment of possible 
dominance (that is, potential competition). It is sometimes mentioned under product 
market definition, but is not generally a sufficient condition for extending the definition of 
the relevant market. 75 However cogent evidence on the potential for supply-side 
substitutability is accepted by the Commission as relevant in determining whether a 
concentration gives an undertaking the ability to act independently of its competitors. 
Equally, the complete absence of such material may reinforce a narrow product market 
definition and a finding of dominance. 
In Continental Can76 it was suggested that supply substitutability exists when the relevant 
technology is available and when only a minor adjustment into one's production process is 
necessary to enter the field. 77 The court recognised that the extent of supply 
substitutability coming from either captive producers or producers of other types of can 
was important in determining the relevant market from the point of view of the rules of 
competition. Difficulties in assessing supply substitutability arise when the relevant 
technology is not well -developed or where the cost or risk of adaptation is unreasonably 
75CJ Cook and CS Kerse EC Merger Control (Sweet and Maxwell Ltd, London, 1996). 
76 Continental Can v Commission [1973] ECR 215. 
77 FL Fine Mergers and Joint Ventures in Europe: The Law and Policy of the EEC (2 ed, Members of the 
Klumer Academic Publishers Group, London, 1994). 
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large. In Commercial Solvents78 the court suggested that one product cannot be 
substitutable for another on the supply side unless the know how necessary to manufacture 
the former product exists on an industrial scale. 
The 1997 Draft Notice states that supply side substitutes whose "effects are equivalent to 
those of demand substitutes in terms of effectiveness and immediacy" will be included in 
the market definition. Where supply side substitution is not immediate and would require 
some additional investment and time, then supply side substitutes will be treated like 
potential entrants and will not be included in the market definition. 
F Supply Side Considerations: Market Definition or Market Power? 
Judge Mason and Wilson J claimed in Queensland Wire that: 
79 
In identifying the relevant market, it must be borne in mind that the object is to discover 
the degree of the defendant's market power. Defining the market and evaluating the 
degree of power in that market are part of the same process and it is for the sake of 
simplicity of analysis that the two are separated. 
However, Crowther suggests that the logical approach to take is to define the market on a 
demand-side basis and consider potential market entrants alongside market incumbents. 
78 Jstituto Chemioterapico Italiano v Commission [1974] l CMLR 309. 
79 Above n 25, 50,008. This statement was approved in New Zealand in Union Shipping NZ Ltd & Anor v 
Port Nelson Ltd (1990) 3 NZBLC. 
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This maintains the strong distinction between actual and potential competition, however 
quickly the potential competition might be deemed likely to arise. In this way, aspects of 
potential competition are not subject to the double test of whether they impose an 
effective restraint or not. 80 
From a procedural perspective there are two advantages of a purely demand-side 
approach. The first is that it allows the initial assessment of competition in a relatively 
short time span. It is only when demand-substitutes are perceived to be relatively weak or 
few that one must give consideration to longer term possibilities. Market definition must 
only be seen as a prelude to a full investigation of the possible costs of acquisition or of 
the dominance of a particular undertaking. 81 The second advantage from a procedural 
perspective is that it enables consistency across cases. Where supply-side substitutes are 
included at the stage of market definition, and then further products are considered in the 
next stage, ( the market participation stage), this means that the market has not been 
correctly delimited in the first place and may lead to double counting.
82 
Crowther suggests that a demand-side approach should on the whole give a more useful 
reflection of the present state of the market. The mere fact that market definition based on 
demand-side approach does not indicate the true level of substitutability or products in 
certain circumstances is not a justification for including supply substitutes in every 
analysis. A manufacturer considering a switch of production techniques to producing a 
80 Above n 44 181. 
81 Above n 44, 182. 
82 Above n 44, 182. 
42 
new product (or alternatively, entering the market with a new production technique) will 
need to make the decision very carefully. In particular, it will need to estimate how long 
the presumed price rise will last. 83 
The New Zealand Guidelines appear to adopt this approach by concentrating on demand 
side considerations largely to the exclusion of supply side factors but, at the same time, 
acknowledging that supply side considerations may be included in the market definition 
process. The Commission in Goodman Fielder, in determining a total of 15 relevant 
markets to the proposed merger, included supply substitution only in the market for the 
production and acquisition of premium pastry flour market. In most circumstances the 
amount of product differentiation between types of flour is quite small and the flours could 
be produced by any of the major millers. However, in the case of premium pastry flour, 
for which there are no suitable substitutes, and which is more expensive to produce, the 
number of producers is strictly limited to the current three producers due to the need for a 
large throughput and modem production techniques. 84 
Crowther suggests that the only justification for including supply side substitutes in the 
relevant market is the readiness of competition authorities to equate market definition with 
dominance. 85 If market definition is to be a useful stage of analysis, it should be 
83 Above n 44, 183. 
84This flour is milled from the centre of the wheat grain, and so can constitute at most only 8% to 12% of 
the grain milled. 
85 This is what Mason J and Wilson J were saying in Queensland Wire. See above n 79. 
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recognised for what it is, namely an initial process 
of determining what the relevant 
products for consideration are at the time of analysis.
 The correct approach to market 
definition lies in the distinction between actual and po
tential competition. Any form of 
supply substitution is an assessment of potential com
petition, an attempt to determine 
whether, if (for example) a merger was to go ahead and 
the merged entity were to start 
charging monopoly prices, would market forces rea
ct to restrict such activity. By 
contrast, demand substitutability asks the question 
"what actual products does the 
customer perceive as being substitutable for the prod
ucts of the merged entity". The 
distinction to be made is that by considering demand su
bstitutability one is in effect taking 
a snapshot of a particular market to determine whic
h existing products are viewed as 
substitutable at that particular point, whereas if one inclu
des supply-side aspects, one is 
making predictions as to the way the market is likely
 to develop, whether in the short, 
medium or long term.86 The New Zealand Guideli
nes purport to follow Crowther's 
reasoning. Section 3(9) of the Commerce Act expre
ssly states that when determining 
whether two or more persons, who are interconnect
ed, are in a postion to exercsie a 
dominant influence over the production, acquisition, su
pply or price of goods or services, 
regard shall be had to the extent to which they are co
nstrained by potential competitors 
and suppliers in that market. These are clearly co
nsiderations at the later stage of 
analysis, not at the market defintion stage. 
Ultimately, regardless of whether supply side substi
tutes are included at the market 
definition stage or the barriers to entry stage, the result
 is likely to be the same because of 
86 Above n 44, 184. 
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supply elasticity is high under either measu
re, the merging firms will lack substantial 
market power. Nevertheless, there are diff
erences in the relevant evidence and perhaps
 
the degree of confidence in the judgements of
 the Commission. 
VI PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
The theory of price discrimination enters in
to market definition when the hypothetical 
monopolist would have the ability to distingu
ish customers who continue to purchase the 
product when the price increases ( captiv
e consumers) from customers who stop 
purchasing or purchase less when the price
 increases (precarious consumers). If the 
hypothetical monopolist can discriminate bet
ween these customers, for example by their 
uses or locations, it will have the incentive to
 charge customers different prices depending
 
on their willingness to pay for the product. 
Both the United States and New Zealand G
uidelines allow for the examination into the
 
extent of, or potential for, price discriminat
ion within relevant identified markets. The
 
Commission may define smaller relevant mark
ets based on particular uses for a product or 
service, particular groups of buyers, or buyers
 in particular geographic regions.
87 
Ability to discriminate can arise in a variety o
f ways. The product may have some special 
features that are essential to the purchaser, pr
eventing him or her from switching products. 
Even when a products or services are identi
cal, a firm's reputation and the reluctance of
 
87Aboven3, 16. 
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some purchasers to switch from the known and liked, may cause some customers to pay 
the higher price rather than switch. Ultimately the hypothetical mono po list must be able 
to identify the customers to whom price can be increased. 
If it is simply assumed that a hypothetical monopolist can price discriminate, incorrect 
conclusions may result. With no price discrimination currently existing, the assumption 
that a hypothetical monopolist could price discriminate is all the more speculative.
88 
The 
ability to discriminate will be defeated if customers buying at a lower price engage in 
arbitrage (buying a product in quantity and reselling it to the other disfavoured consumers. 
While the ability to discriminate is difficult to prove, it is not impossible to do. However, 
the Guidelines themselves do not state how the Commission will identify price 
discrimination. 
VII PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND PREMIUM MARKETS 
A Premium Product Markets 
Given that for almost all products there exists a certain amount of brand loyalty, even in a 
competitive industry there will be a degree of price inelasticity over a certain range of 
prices. Many manufacturers will have at least a small ability to profit by raising prices 
above marginal cost. Other imperfections in markets, such as information failures, 
88 JA Hausner, GL Leonard, CA Velture "Market Definition Under Price Discrimination" (1996) 64 
Antitrust Law Journal 369, 372. 
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transaction costs, and small geographic market size imply the same result. Small 
monopoly profits originate from firms sufficiently differentiating themselves from others 
by making their particular product more attractive to consumers
89
• 
Merger investigations in the United States suggest that brand reputation and consumer 
loyalty to brand name products may lead to enforcement agencies recognising either 
premium product markets or significant entry barriers under the United States Guidelines. 
In United States v Gillette Co90 , which involved Gillette's proposed takeover of Parker 
Pen Holdings Ltd, the Justice Department sought a market definition of premium fountain 
pens, in which the acquisition may substantially lessen competition. Gillette argued that 
the court could not segregate the market based on price and that the market should 
include other writing instruments that competed against premium fountain pens. The 
court ruled that the relevant market consisted of "all premium writing instruments" with 
retail prices from 40 to 400 dollars.91 The decision is note-worthy because of the court's 
willingness to accept a premium product market that excluded lower-priced functional 
substitutes. 
When determining whether a premium market exists, the existence of different price tiers 
or price structures among functionally interchangeable products may signal to the 
enforcement agency that a certain degree of demand inelasticity already exists for the 
product in the upper price tier. It will then be necessary to assess whether this demand 
89 Above n 28. 
9o 828 F Supp 78 (DDC 1993). 
91 Above n 90, 83. 
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inelasticity is of a degree sufficient 
to support a "premium "product m
arket definition for 
the higher price product tier, by app
lying the ssnip test.9
2 
Factors to consider in the determin
ation of premium product markets 
include whether the 
relevant product is a well-estab
lished branded product with en
trenched consumer 
recognition; whether significant p
rice differentials between branded
 and private-label 
products exist in the market; wheth
er customers face significant switch
ing costs possibly 
attributable either to actual quality
 differences or perceived risk in sw
itching to a lesser 
known brand; whether distributor
s are reluctant to stock non-estab
lished brands; and 
whether substantial sunk costs in 
marketing and advertising are nec
essary to build a 
competitive brand reputation.
93 The presence of these factors in a
 particular case, of 
course, must be examined on an 
individual basis. The Guidelines 
present a workable 
framework for identifying and exam
ining them. 
B Innovation Issues 
The narrow market approach which
 results from the ssnip test's definit
ion of the "smallest 
market" in which a hypothetical mo
nopolist could impose a price incre
ase potentially fails 
to take account of innovative indu
stries. Innovation creates uncertai
nties about market 
structure and the course of develop
ment. A broader market definition
 would alleviate the 
problem of overenforcement by inc
luding the spectrum of partial substi
tutes and emerging 
92 See discussion in DJ Dadoun and D
L Dietrich "After Gillette: An Ana
lysis of Premium Product 
Markets Under the 1992 Merger G
uidelines" (1993) 17 Harvard Jour
nal of Law and Public Policy 567. 
93 Above n 88, 589. 
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replacements that the "smallest market" approach can ignore. As the ssnip test requires 
the enforcing agency to begin its investigation by choosing the smallest market in which 
the firms' products compete it is arguable that the process is biased toward unjustifiably 
narrow product markets.94 Similarly the ssnip test will generally not work for innovation 
markets because those markets do not have any existing products about which to ask the 
price increase question.95 However, the New Zealand Guidelines state that the 
Commission will take into account recent developments, and likely future developments, 
in products and production technology in the process of market defintion. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
The ssmp test was originally a United States test, deriving from a distinct social, 
commercial and constitutional setting. As such, adaptation into New Zealand competition 
law should be done with caution. As McGechan J stated "[i]t is the task of this Court to 
interpret and apply the New Zealand Commerce Act 1986. It is not a matter of importing 
common law doctrine".96 However, the inclusion of the ssnip test in the New Zealand 
Business Acquisition Guidelines is, in reality, a mere formalisation of a test which was 
already in use by the Commission and the courts. What the Guidelines do is clarify and 
harmonise the approach to be taken and provide an insight into Commission practice for 
94 AC Hruska "A Broad Market Approach to Antitrust Product Market Definition in innovative 
lndusstries" 1992) 102 YLJ 305. 
95 DA Yao and SS Desanti "Innovation Issues Under Merger Guidelines" (1996) 61 Antitrust Law 
Journal 505, 510. 
96 
Union Shipping New Zealand Ltd &Anor v Port Nelson Limited(l990) 3 NZBLC 101,640, 101,645. 
The statement was made in reference to the essential facilities doctrine. 
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the business community. The only major variance from past judicial practice is the 
exclusion of supply side considerations from market definition. Although such a move is 
justified by separating market definition from market dominance considerations, the 
Guidelines do not rule out the possibility of including supply side factors in the market 
definition process if the analysis of the particular market requires a more supply side focus. 
The fact that the Commission has considered supply side factors in decisions subsequent 
to the publication of the Guidelines indicates that the Guidelines have, in reality, done little 
to alter judicial tendency to include supply side factors in the market definition. The 
Guidelines have allowed considerable flexibility in the application of the ssnip test. Any 
potential problems which may arise with respect to the size of the hypothetical price 
increase, the duration of the hypothetical price increase, less than competitive prevailing 
price levels and price discrimination have been addressed by the Guidelines which allow 
adaptability to diverse circumstances. In effect, the inclusion of the ssnip test in the 
Business Acquisition Guidelines has brought New Zealand into line with other major 
jurisdictions with no significant consequences for current practice in market definition. 
50 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Texts 
RJ Ahdar ( ed) Competition Law and Policy in New Zealand (The Law Book Co Ltd, 
Sydney, 1991 ). 
CJ Cook and CS Kerse EC Merger Control (Sweet and Maxwell Ltd, London, 1996). 
FL Fine Mergers and Joint Ventures in Europe: The Law and Policy of the EEC (2 ed, 
Members of the Klumer Academic Publishers Group, London, 1994). 
H Hovenkamp Federal Antitrust: The Law of Competition and its Practice (West 
Publishing Co, Minnesota, 1994). 
EW Kintner Federal Antitrust Law (Anderson Publishing Co, Cincinnatti, Volume IV, 
1984) 
RJ Larner and JW Meehan Jnr (eds) Economics and Antitrust Policy (Quorum Books, 
Connecticut, 1989). 
Y Van Roy Guidebook to New Zealand Competition Laws (CCH New Zealand Ltd, 
Auckland, 1991). 
Journals 
MN Berry "The Commerce Commission's First Business Acquisitions Guidelines: A 
Comment" (1997) 3 NZBLQ 75. 
M Brunt "'Market Definition' Issues in Australian and New Zealand Trade Practices 
Litigation" [1990] ABLR 86. 
D Bull "Implementing Department of Justice Merger Guidelines" (1996) 41 Antitrust 
Bulletin 678. 
T Calvani and WT Miller "31 Questions" (1993) 38 Antitrust Bulletin 593. 
WA Cann Jnr "The New Merger Guidelines - Is the Department of Justice Enforcing the 
Law?" (1983) 21 American Business Law Journal 1. 
PS Crampton "Canada's New Merger Enforcement Guidelines: A 'Nuts and Bolts' 
Review" (1993) 38 Antitrust Bulletin 665. 
SG Corones "The Revised ACCC Merger Guidelines" (1996) 24 ABLR 402. 
51 
P Crowther "Product Market Definition in EC Competition Law: The Compatibility of 
Legal and Economic Approaches" [1996] JBL 177. 
DJ Dadoun and DL Dietrich "After Gillette: An Analysis of Premium Product Markets 
Under the 1992 Merger Guidelines" (1993) 17 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 
567. 
JA Hausner, GL Leonard, CA Velture "Market Definition Under Price Discrimination" 
(1996) 64 Antitrust Law Journals 365. 
GA Hay "Market Definition and Market Dominance: Issues From the Davids-QIW 
Merger Case" (1995) 3 CCLJ 1. 
G Hay and J Walker "Merger Policy and the TPC's Draft Merger Guidelines" (1993) 1 
CCLJ 33. 
AC Hruska "A Broad Market Approach to Antitrust Product Market Definition in 
Innovative Industries" (1992) 102 YLJ 305. 
L Pasternak "The New Merger Guidelines and Section 50 of the Trade Practices Act" 
(1994) 17 UNSWLJ 73. 
R Pitofsky "New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust" (1990) 90 
Columbia Law Review 1805. 
RL Smith "Practical Problems of Market Definition Revisited" (1995) 23 ABLR 52. 
J Walker "Merger Misconceptions" (1996) 4 CCLJ 125. 
GJ Werden "Market Delineation" (1993) 38 Antitrust Bulletin 517. 
DA Yao and SS Desanti "Innovation Issues Under Merger Guidelines" (1993) 61 
Antitrust Law Journal 505. 
Other References 
Lexecon Competition Memo: The Modernisation ofDGIV. 
Commerce Commission Business Acquisition Guidelines 1996. 
VICTORIA 
UNIVERSITY 
OF 
A Fine According to Library WELLINGTON 
Regulations is charged on 
Overdue Books. LIBRARY 
LAW IBAAR 
/(~ 
VI l1l111 1ij11~11ij~ [11i1t11111~ 11111~~ ~~f 1~[111~111~ li~~~~f 11 
3 7212 00556702 7 


